The Kremlin’s covert campaign against the West has entered a new, openly chaotic phase, a shift outlined in a leaked joint FSB-SVR paper that declares Russia to be “at a state of war” and discards the old moral and legal rules that once guided Soviet-era intelligence exchanges.
The document, obtained by Western analysts, signals that Moscow has abandoned any attempt to present itself as a “good guy” and now seeks to sow disorder across Europe and the United States, funding assassinations and sabotage through a market-based network of private actors that includes oligarchs, state-linked enterprises such as Gazprom, and weapons manufacturers.
A Cash-Driven Intelligence Network
The transformation of Russian intelligence into a cash-driven enterprise is already bearing tangible results.
Offshore accounts are believed to hold roughly $1.9 billion earmarked for “kill-for-cash” units, while newly identified SVR operatives—more than 6,500 placed worldwide in a single day—have been linked to a string of low-cost, high-risk attacks.
In the United Kingdom, a group of young Ukrainians, allegedly manipulated by Russian handlers, attempted to set fire to the former prime minister’s residence. The ringleader now serves an eight-year sentence, while two accomplices were released early under a policy that allows foreign nationals with criminal records to be deported after serving half their term.
Similar infiltration routes have been traced entering the United States via Mexico, and a recent break-in at an empty apartment in Vienna, foiled by the speaker’s daughter, exposed a sixth cell of would-be assassins who failed to notice a family member still inside the premises.
Hired operatives have reportedly been paid as little as $2,000-$3,000 to torch shopping malls, underscoring the Kremlin’s reliance on inexpensive, disposable actors.
Western Response to the Threat
Analysts argue that responsibility for these operations rests with the Kremlin rather than the individual operatives, urging Western policymakers to “cut the head of the monster.”
European capitals—including the United Kingdom, France, the Scandinavian states, and the Baltic nations—have already reclassified the conflict as a hot war and are strengthening intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities in response to the heightened threat.
Growing Pressure Inside Russia
Beyond the covert conflict, Russia’s internal stability appears increasingly precarious.
Economic forecasts from multiple intelligence sources predict a decisive turning point in the third or fourth quarter of the year, when the combined impact of sanctions, war expenditures, and the reversal of the oil-price windfall that briefly benefited Putin’s government after the 2022 conflict in Iran could trigger a broader systemic crisis.
Gas shortages reminiscent of the 1990s have begun to emerge, weakening the social contract that once exchanged public acceptance for economic stability.
Even within the security establishment, confidence appears to be declining. A Russian intelligence publication reportedly accused President Vladimir Putin of “totally screwing up the war,” while senior officials such as FSB chief Nikolai Patrushev are alleged to be pursuing personal Middle East ventures linked to the Russian shadow fleet and encouraging previously uncorrupted elites to “start making millions.”
Political Uncertainty and Possible Successors
The elite’s dilemma mirrors the broader political stalemate.
While many oligarchs possess significant financial resources and, through FSB connections, operational influence that could challenge Putin, fear of being the first to act has largely kept them on the sidelines.
The 2022 Prigozhin rebellion demonstrated the potential for a right-wing faction to challenge the leadership, but observers now contend that a coalition of financial elites and elements within the security services is more likely to shape any post-Putin government.
Possible outcomes range from a short-lived military coup—expected to generate six to twelve months of escalation before economic realities take hold—to the emergence of a “mafia state” resembling Russia in the late 1990s, where FSB and oligarchic networks operate a semi-democratic but less confrontational government.
Military Strategy and Regional Concerns
In the near term, Moscow appears focused on achieving symbolic political victories rather than major territorial expansion.
Analysts anticipate constitutional moves to formally annex territories already under Russian control, including South Ossetia, before the end of the year.
At the same time, the Kremlin is considered unlikely to resort to nuclear weapons. Instead, analysts suggest it could attempt a diversionary attack against a third country to distract from setbacks in Ukraine, a possibility that has heightened concerns in the Baltic states and Poland.
A Personal Perspective on the Conflict
The personal dimension of the ongoing conflict was illustrated through the experiences of a former Wall Street Journal reporter detained in Russia, whose family now lives under Austrian security protection after years of separation.
His observations reflect a broader belief among some Russian opposition figures that any successor to Putin could distance themselves from the current conflict by declaring, “this is not my war,” potentially opening the door to a negotiated end to hostilities.
Looking Ahead
As Western governments confront a hybrid threat increasingly supported by private Russian interests, analysts suggest that economic strain, elite dissatisfaction, and an increasingly unpredictable foreign policy may ultimately shape Russia’s future more than conventional battlefield outcomes.
Rather than military victory alone determining events, internal political and economic pressures could play the defining role in Russia’s next chapter.